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Lizahana -> RE: War in Iraq (8/4/2005 9:22:50 PM)
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quote:
ORIGINAL: Dancre quote:
ORIGINAL: Dancre MMM. . . . . rather interesting that folks ignore the truth and want to believe these silly lies. well to help you all along, since you do ignore the truth, i thought i'd bring the truth to you in the form of Mr. Duelfer's report. unfortunately, copy right laws forbid me from posting all of it, so here are some key points. are we ready? here we go: Regime Strategic Intent: Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted. • Saddam totally dominated the Regime’s strategic decision making. He initiated most of the strategic thinking upon which decisions were made, whether in matters of war and peace (such as invading Kuwait), maintaining WMD as a national strategic goal, or on how Iraq was to position itself in the international community. Loyal dissent was discouraged and constructive variations to the implementation of his wishes on strategic issues were rare. Saddam was the Regime in a strategic sense and his intent became Iraq’s strategic policy. • Saddam’s primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security of the Regime. He sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections—to gain support for lifting sanctions—with his intention to preserve Iraq’s intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed, this remained the goal to the end of the Regime, as the starting of any WMD program, conspicuous or otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions and jeopardizing a political end to the embargo and international monitoring. • The introduction of the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) in late 1996 was a key turning point for the Regime. OFF rescued Baghdad’s economy from a terminal decline created by sanctions. The Regime quickly came to see that OFF could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development. • By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their international support. Iraq was within striking distance of a de facto end to the sanctions regime, both in terms of oil exports and the trade embargo, by the end of 1999. Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability—which was essentially destroyed in 1991—after sanctions were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability—in an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities. • Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that events in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped Saddam’s belief in the value of WMD. In Saddam’s view, WMD helped to save the Regime multiple times. He believed that during the Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attacks on Tehran had broken its political will. Similarly, during Desert Storm, Saddam believed WMD had deterred Coalition Forces from pressing their attack beyond the goal of freeing Kuwait. WMD had even played a role in crushing the Shi’a revolt in the south following the 1991 cease-fire. • The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identifi able group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieu-tenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them. Regime Finance and Procurement: Throughout the 1990s and up to OIF (March 2003), Saddam focused on one set of objectives: the survival of himself, his Regime, and his legacy. To secure those objectives, Saddam needed to exploit Iraqi oil assets, toportray a strong military capability to deter internal and external threats, and to foster his image as an Arab leader. Saddam recognized that the reconstitution of Iraqi WMD enhanced both his security and image. Conse-quently, Saddam needed to end UN-imposed sanctions to fulfill his goals. One aspect of Saddam’s strategy of unhinging the UN’s sanctions against Iraq, centered on Saddam’s efforts to influence certain UN SC permanent members, such as Russia, France, and China and some nonpermanent (Syria, Ukraine) members to end UN sanctions. Under Saddam’s orders, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) formulated and implemented a strategy aimed at these UNSC members and international public opinion with the purpose of ending UN sanctions and undermining its subsequent OFF program by diplomatic and economic means. At a minimum, Saddam wanted to divide the five permanent members and foment international public support of Iraq at the UN and throughout the world by a savvy public relations campaign and an extensive diplomatic effort. Another element of this strategy involved circumventing UN sanctions and the OFF program by means of “Protocols” or government-to-government economic trade agreements. Protocols allowed Saddam to generate a large amount of revenue outside the purview of the UN. The successful implementation of the Protocols, continued oil smuggling efforts, and the manipulation of UN OFF contracts emboldened Saddam to pursue his military reconstitution efforts starting in 1997 and peaking in 2001. These efforts covered conventional arms, dual-use goods acquisition, and some WMD-related programs. ISG uncovered Iraqi plans or designs for three long-range ballistic missiles with ranges from 400 to 1,000 km and for a 1,000-km-range cruise missile, although none of thses systems progressed to production and only one reportedly passed the design phase. ISG assesses that these plans demonstrate Saddam's continuing desire-up to the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)-for a long-range delivery capability. [a side note: on the show Front Line "looking for suddam's weapons", after the invasion by american forces, a reporter interviewed one of the engineers who was to design one of these missiles. He confirmed these missiles but was executed by the bath party the next day.] The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge-base needed to restart a CW program, conduct a modest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from the decline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf war and UN-sponsored destruction and sanctions. Iraq implemented a rigorous and formalized system of nationwide research and production of chemicals, but ISG will not be able to resolve whether Iraq intended the system to underpin any CW-related efforts. • The Regime employed a cadre of trained and experienced researchers, production managers, and weaponization experts from the former CW program. • Iraq began implementing a range of indigenous chemical production projects in 1995 and 1996. Many of these projects, while not weapons-related, were designed to improve Iraq’s infrastructure, which would have enhanced Iraq’s ability to produce CW agents if the scaled-up production processes were implemented. The above is only sections of the reportThe whole report can be found here: http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/dciwmd93004kf.pdf Now after reading the above, i for one am glad that "dimbulb" took us to war. from the evidence presented by those working with and for Hussain, it would only have been a matter of time before Hussain would have had a working chemical weapons program. And based on other evidence in this report it is clear he would have turned his sights on the US and her allies. I think this ends this discussion, unless there are others who wish to throw out silly, meaningless, hate filled excuses that have no merit or facts behind them. unless of course, this report scares the living blank out of you, then meaningless excuses are understandable. kim and just for clarification, here is my post. notice this statement here: Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted. also see this one: b]One aspect of Saddam’s strategy of unhinging the UN’s sanctions against Iraq, centered on Saddam’s efforts to influence certain UN SC permanent members, such as Russia, France, and China and some nonpermanent (Syria, Ukraine) members to end UN sanctions. Under Saddam’s orders, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) formulated and implemented a strategy aimed at these UNSC members and international public opinion with the purpose of ending UN sanctions and undermining its subsequent OFF program by diplomatic and economic means. At a minimum, Saddam wanted to divide the five permanent members and foment international public support of Iraq at the UN and throughout the world by a savvy public relations campaign and an extensive diplomatic effort. in otherwords, Hussain was WORKING to CREATE a NEW WMD program. see above. He was WORKING toward bringing DOWN the sactions so he could BUILD a program. no weapons were ever found, i'll give you that one, but if you read the WHOLE report it will say, and i repeat again, HE WANTED AND WAS WORKING TO BUILD A NEW WEAPON PROGRAM. If we hadn't gone to war, Hussain would have succeeded in CREATING a new weapons program as is seen by the WHOLE report. thank you. kim [8D] Hi Kim :) 1) I posted MY link directly from the horse's mouth, the CIA: http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004 ; 2) Where in your posted quotes, does it say that Hussein POSSESSED WMD? Please show me, in your posts, where it states that Hussein in fact, possessed WMD. All your posts say is that Hussein was PLANNING to restart "WHEN" sanctions were lifted. I posted straight from the Key findings of the CIA website - in there, it quite plainly says that Hussein did NOT possess WMD; if you still think otherwise, you must be in denial; 3) Continuing from the aforementioned, I will ask it again: if you believe that, because Hussein may have been planning to restart his WMD programs after sanctions were lifted, do you believe we should invade these types of countries (of which there are many); over other countries that ACTUALLY HAVE WMD, and that were ACTUALLY LAUNCHING MISSILES into the Pacific, like North Korea, at the VERY SAME TIME we were planning to invade Iraq? I am not saying we should've invaded North Korea - I am just trying to understand the way you think. And please, answer the question. 4) Notice that those ex-presidents, countries who also BELIEVED Hussein had WMD - notice that they did NOT unilaterally invade Iraq - you know, like we did. Now you may think this is not a big difference, but to me, this is a glaring difference - one that has cost the Iraqi people 25,000 innocents dead and the loss of 1700+ of our best & brightest; 5) Don't you find it ironic that we supplied Hussein with biological, chemical weapons in the 1980's; that the US CIA funded bin Laden in the early 1980's? It is interesting how you ignored that in your post.... Ciao. Peace & God bless :)
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